Abstract. We study cryptographic attacks on random Feistel schemes. We denote by m the number of plaintext/ciphertext pairs, and by k the number of rounds. In their famous paper [3], M. Luby and C. Rackoff have completely solved the cases m 2 n/2 : the schemes are secure against all adaptive chosen plaintext attacks (CPA-2) when k ≥ 3 and against all adaptive chosen plaintext and chosen ciphertext attacks (CPCA-2) when k ≥ 4 (for this second result a proof is given in [9] ). In this paper we study the cases m 2 n . We will use the "coefficients . Furthermore, in all these cases we have always obtained an explicit majoration for the distinguishing probability. In the second part of this paper, we present some improved generic attacks. For k = 5 rounds, we present a KPA with m 2 3n/2 and a non-adaptive chosen plaintext attack (CPA-1) with m 2 n . For k ≥ 7 rounds we also show some improved attacks against random Feistel generators (with more than one permutation to analyze and ≥ 2 2n computations).
Abstract. We study cryptographic attacks on random Feistel schemes. We denote by m the number of plaintext/ciphertext pairs, and by k the number of rounds. In their famous paper [3] , M. Luby and C. Rackoff have completely solved the cases m 2 n/2 : the schemes are secure against all adaptive chosen plaintext attacks (CPA-2) when k ≥ 3 and against all adaptive chosen plaintext and chosen ciphertext attacks (CPCA-2) when k ≥ 4 (for this second result a proof is given in [9] ). In this paper we study the cases m 2 n . We will use the "coefficients H technique" of proof to analyze known plaintext attacks (KPA), adaptive or non-adaptive chosen plaitext attacks (CPA-1 and CPA-2) and adaptive or non-adaptive chosen plaitext and chosen ciphertext attacks (CPCA-1 and CPCA-2). In the first part of this paper, we will show that when m 2 n the schemes are secure against all KPA when k ≥ 4, against all CPA-2 when k ≥ 5 and against all CPCA-2 attacks when k ≥ 6. This solves an open problem of [1] , [14] , and it improves the result of [14] (where more rounds were needed and m 2 n(1−ε) was obtained instead of m 2 n ). The number 5 of rounds is minimal since CPA-2 attacks on 4 rounds are known when m ≥ O(2 n/2 ) (see [1] , [10] ). Furthermore, in all these cases we have always obtained an explicit majoration for the distinguishing probability. In the second part of this paper, we present some improved generic attacks. For k = 5 rounds, we present a KPA with m 2 3n/2 and a non-adaptive chosen plaintext attack (CPA-1) with m 2 n . For k ≥ 7 rounds we also show some improved attacks against random Feistel generators (with more than one permutation to analyze and ≥ 2 2n computations).
Introduction
A "Luby -Rackoff construction with k rounds", which is also known as a "random Feistel cipher" is a Feistel cipher in which the round functions f 1 , . . . , f k are independently chosen as truly random functions (see section 2 for precise definitions).
Since the famous original paper [3] of M. Luby and C. Rackoff, these constructions have inspired a considerable amount of research. In [8] and [14] a summary of existing works on this topic is given.
We will denote by k the number of rounds and by n the integer such that the Feistel cipher is a permutation of 2n bits → 2n bits. In [3] it was proved that when k ≥ 3 these Feistel ciphers are secure against all adaptative chosen plaintext attacks (CPA-2) when the number of queries (i.e. plaintext/ciphertext pairs obtained) is m 2 n/2 . Moreover when k ≥ 4 they are secure against all adaptative chosen plaintext and chosen ciphertext attacks (CPCA-2) when the number of queries is m 2 n/2 (a proof of this second result is given in [9] ).
These results are valid if the adversary has unbounded computing power as long as he does only m queries.
These results can be applied in two different ways: directly using k truly random functions f 1 , . . . , f k (that requires significant storage), or in a hybrid setting, in which instead of using k truly random functions f 1 , . . . , f k , we use k pseudo-random functions. These two ways are both interesting for cryptography. The first way gives "locally random permutations" where we have proofs of security without any unproven hypothesis (but we need a lot of storage), and the second way gives constructions for block encryption schemes where the security can be relied on a pseudo-random number generator, or on any one-way function.
In this paper, we will study security when m 2 n , instead of m 2
for the original paper of M. Luby and C. Rackoff. For this we must have k ≥ 5, since for k ≤ 4 some CPA-2 attacks when m ≥ O(2 n/2 ) exist (see [1] , [10] ). Moreover the bound m 2 n is the larger bound that we can get, since an adversary with unlimited computing power can always distinguish a k-round random Feistel scheme from a random permutation with O(k · 2 n ) queries and O(2 kn2 n ) computations by simply guessing all the round functions (it is also possible to do less computing with the same number of queries by using collisions, see [13] ).
The bound m 2 n/2 is called the 'birthday bound', i.e. it is about the square root of the optimal bound against an adversary with unbounded computing power. In [1] W. Aiello and R. Venkatesan have found a construction of locally random functions ('Benes') where the optimal bound (m 2 n ) is obtained instead of the birthday bound. However here the functions are not permutations. Similarly, in [4] , U. Maurer has found some other construction of locally random functions (not permutations) where he can get as close as wanted to the optimal bound (i.e. m 2 n(1− ) and for all > 0 he has a construction). In [8] the security of unbalanced Feistel schemes is studied and a security proof in 2
is obtained, instead of 2 n/2 , but for much larger round functions (from 2n bits to bits, instead of n bits to n bits). This bound is basically again the birthday bound for these functions.
In this paper we will show that 5-round random Feistel schemes resist all CPA-2 attacks when m 2 n and that 6-round random Feistel schemes resist all CPCA-2 attacks when m 2 n . Here we are very near the optimal bound, and we have permutations. This solves an open problem of [1] , [10] . It also significantly improves the results of [6] in which the 2 n security is only obtained when the number of rounds tends to infinity, and the result of [14] where 2 n(1− ) security was proved for CPA-2 after 7 rounds (instead of 5 here) and for CPCA-2 after 10 rounds (instead of 6 here). Moreover we will obtain in this paper some explicit and simple majorations for the distinguishing probabilities. We will also present some improved generic attacks. All these results are summarized in appendix A.
Notations
General notations
n denotes the set of the 2 n binary strings of length n. Then by definition We will first study 4 rounds (with some limitations on the inputs/outputs), then prove our cryptographic results by adding one or two rounds.
Notations for 4 rounds
• We will denote by [L i , R i ], 1 ≤ i ≤ m, the m cleartexts. These cleartexts can be assumed to be pairwise distinct, i.
• We call "index" any integer between 1 and m.
• [R i , X i ] is the output after one round, i.e.
• [X i , Y i ] is the output after two rounds, i.e.
• [Y i , S i ] is the output after three rounds, i.e.
• [S i , T i ] is the output after 4 rounds, i.e.
Notations for 5 rounds We keep the same notations for
Part I: Security results 3 The general proof strategy
We will first study the properties of 4-round schemes. Our result on 4-round schemes for proving KPA security will be:
satisfies:
α and β can be chosen
1 when m 2 n .
For 5 rounds, we will have : 
, and α and β can be chosen
, and it will give security against CPA-2. If E depends on the [L i , R i ], we will obtain security against CPA-1 only. 2. Instead of fixing a set E, as in theorem 32, we can formulate a similar theorem in term of expectancy of the deviation of H from the average value (see [15] : there is a formulation for CPA-1 and another for CPA-2). From these formulas we will get security when m 2 n .
For 6 rounds, we will have :
Theorem 33 (6 rounds) There are some values α > 0 and β > 0 and there is a subset E ⊂ I 4m n such that:
For all super distinguishing circuit Φ with m oracle gates, the probability that
Now from these theorems and from the general "coefficients H technique" theorems given in [11] , [12] , we will get immediately that when m 2 n , Ψ 4 is secure against all KPA, Ψ 5 against all CPA-2 and Ψ 6 against all CPCA-2.
Circles
One of the terms of the the deviation of Ψ k from random permutations will be the probability to get "circles" in the variables, as we will explain below.
Definition We will say that we have 'a circle in R, X, Y ' if there are k indices i 1 , . . . , i k with k ≥ 3 and such that:
we have at least one of the three following conditions:
We will prove the following theorems. Remark In [15] we show that the condition 'with at least one equation Z i = Z j ' is important: sometime we cannot avoid some circles in X, Y .
With 6 rounds, we can get a simpler formula: 
Proof of theorem 41, 42, 43 are given in the extended version of this paper ( [15] ). A basic tool for these proofs is:
Proof This result comes immediately from this lemma:
2·2 n .
Proof of lemma 41
X i = X j means L i ⊕ f 1 (R i ) = L j ⊕ f 1 (R j ). This implies R i = R j (because L i = L j and R i = R j ⇒ i = j). Thus, when (i, j) is fixed, the number of f 1 such that X i = X j is exactly |F n | 2 n if R i = R j ,
and exactly 0 if
2·2 n as claimed.
We give here the main ideas. See the extended version of this paper for more details ( [15] ). We will first prove that if the [Y i , S i ] are given, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, (i.e. the output after 3 rounds), then the S i variables will look random as long as m 2 n (but the Y i variables will not look random in general). Then, with one more round and the same argument, we will obtain that the [S i , T i ] variables will look random as long as m 2 n . We want to evaluate the number H of (1) we had to evaluate the number J of 
We will fix the points (i, j) where X i = X j , i.e. we look for solutions (f 1 , f 2 ) such that X i = X j exactly on these (i, j), and, again, we want to evaluate how the number H of (f 1 , f 2 ) can depend on the values S i (i.e. on the values λ k ).
We will group the equations (2) by the same f 1 (R i ), i.e. by "blocks in R, X, Y ": two indices i and j are in the same block if we can go from i to j by equations
, from these relations, we can replace the variable f 1 (R k ) by the variable f 1 (R l ) instead). Each X i has an expression like this:
This gives a number of solutions for f 1 that depends only of the fact that some equations of degree one in the λ k variables are satisfied or not.
(These equations are X i ⊕ X j = X k ⊕ X l where i, j are in the same block in R, X, Y and k, l are in the same block in R, X, Y , so these equations can be written only the L i and λ k variables).
Example In the example given in appendix B,
is one of these equations, that can be true or not when the λ i values are fixed (here it comes from
Analysis of the dependencies in the λ k First, we can notice that if the system has no solution due to an incompatibility (for example if we want
and X 2 = f 1 (R 1 ) ⊕ λ 1 to be distinct) then we have a circle in R, X, Y with at least one equation in Y . The probability to get such circles has been evaluated in section 4 and is negligible if m 2 n . So we will assume that we have no incompatibility in the system that says that the X i variables considered are pairwise distinct. Let µ be the number of variables λ k that satisfied at least one of these equations among the 
(we denote by A µ this expression).
(since we have ≤ α 2 2 possible equations). We have:
So the weight W λ becomes negligible as soon as µ
Remark If these µ variables λ i generate almost all the possible relations with these variables, then the weight of these variables is even smaller since we just have to choose these µ variables among the α variables and then they are fixed (since almost all the equations are satisfied, many of these equations give equivalent values for the special λ i ). So we will have a C 
No circle in R, X, Y can be created from the equalities
Then the number H F of f 1 , f 2 , f 3 solutions satisfies:
2·2 n comes from the λ i with very few special equalities, and r is a very small term related to the weight of the λ i with a lot of special equalities (as we have seen r is negligible when m 2 n ).
We can do the same for
So, since by summation, we must obtain all the (f 1 , . . . , f 4 ) with no circles, from theorem 51 we will get our results. Here the set E depends on E, so this works for non-adaptive attacks. For adaptive attacks see [15] (then we have to eliminate some equations by conditions in
or to study the expectancy of the deviation of H).
Remark Another possibility is to use the result of [5] : with 2 times more rounds, security in CPA-1 can be changed in security in CPCA-2. However we would get like this CPCA-2 for 10 rounds (exactly as in [14] ) instead of 6 rounds.
Comparing [14] and this paper
Technically the main differences between [14] and this paper are:
1. Here we introduce a condition: no more than [14] ). this gives us security when m 2
n of [14] ). 2. In [14] , 3 rounds are needed for half the variables to look random, and then 4 more rounds for the [S i , T i ]. Here we show that the S i will look random after 4 rounds even if the Z i are public (with a probability near 1 when m 2 n ). So for the T i we can use the same result with only one more round. Like this, we need less rounds in this paper compared with [14] . 3. In this paper we study λ k that come for 
n . We will simply count the number N of (i, j), i < j such that
This number N will be about double for Ψ 5 compared with a truly random permutation. Proof: 
Proof This comes immediately from (#) above.
8 Generic attacks on Ψ k generators, k ≥ 6 Ψ k has always an even signature. This gives an attack in 2 2n if we want to distinguish Ψ k from random permutations (see [13] ) and if we have all the possible cleartext/ciphertext. In this appendix, we will present the best attacks that we know when we want to distinguish Ψ k from random permutations with an even signature, or when we do not have exactly all the possible cleartext/ciphertext.
From [10] or [11] p.146, we know the exact value of H in this case, when k is even. We have:
* is the average value of H on two cleartext/ciphertext. So there is a small deviation, of about
, from the average value. So in a KPA, when the [L i , R i ] are chosen at random, and if the f i functions are chosen at random, we will get slightly more (i, j), i < j,
k (with k even) than from a truly random permutation. This can be detected if we have enough cleartext/ciphertext pairs from many Ψ k permutations. In first approximation, these relations will act like independent Bernoulli variables (in reality the equations are not truly independent, but this is expected to create only a modification of second order). However, if we have µ available permutations, with about 2 2n cleartext/ciphertext for each of these permutations, then N 2 4n µ (here we know these µ permutations almost on every possible cleartext. If not, µ will be larger and we will do more computations). N ≥ 2 (k−2)n gives µ ≥ 2 (k−6)n . This is an attack with 2 (k−6)n permutations and 2 2n µ 2 (k−4)n computations. 2. KPA with k odd.
In [15] , a KPA with k odd is given (it has the same properties as the attack above for k even).
For a block cipher from 2n bits → 2n bits, we generally want to have no better attack than attacks with ≥ 2 2n computations. If this block cipher is a Feistel scheme we then need to have ≥ 6 rounds since (as shown in this paper) there is a generic attack on 5 rounds with 2 n computations in CPA-1 and 2 3n/2 computations in KPA.
In this paper we have also shown that however, in the model where the adversaries have unlimited computing power but have access to only m cleartext/ciphertext pairs, the maximum possible security (i.e. m 2 n ) is obtained already for 5 rounds for CPA-1 and CPA-2 attacks. This solves an open problem of [1] and [14] . Moreover 6-round Feistel schemes can resist all CPCA-1 and CPCA-2 attacks when m 2 n (For CPCA-1 or CPCA-2 the case k = 5 rounds is still unclear: we only know that the security is between m 2 n/2 and m 2 n ). When 2 2n is small (for example to generate 1000 pseudorandom permutations with an even signature of 30 bits → 30 bits) then more than 6 rounds are needed. In this paper we have studied such attacks, and we have extended the "coefficients H technique" to various cryptographic attacks.
We think that our proof strategy is very general and should be also efficient in the future to study different kinds of functions or permutation generators, such as, for example, Feistel schemes with a different group law than ⊕, or unbalanced Feistel schemes.
